NASA
Administrator Sean O’Keefe addressed NASA employees during a briefing to talk about
the proposed changes to the agency which were brought to the attention by the
Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board (C-Span, 2004). One of the main topics
discussed was the NASA safety culture. BST
conducted a series of surveys that assessed NASA employee’s views and opinions regarding
the culture, roles and leadership issues.
I believe that Mr. O’Keefe addressed NASA
employees to describe this plan for proposed changes to the NASA culture
because according to the BST report, the major issues stemmed from issues
within the NASA culture and leadership itself (C-Span, 2004). Mr. O’Keefe explained that the changes needed
to be adopted by all entities within the agency and starting from the top down.
Brown explains “organizational problem
solving means that every member of an organization participates in developing a
vision and improving the corporate culture” (2011, p. 116). The BST survey results based on interviews
with NASA employees pointed out two important concerns (C-Span, 2004). The first concern was that there was a lack
of respect between leadership and employees.
Employees felt that communication
was lacking between the higher levels and the employees. They also felt that the climate at the agency
impeded employees from being able to speak up.
In fact, according to the BST report, employees stated that they were encouraged
my management to keep their ideas and/or concerns to themselves and not voice
these opinions (BST, 2004). This was a major concern and area that Mr. O’Keefe
heatedly emphasized needed improvement. The
second major concern, which was rooted first at the leadership level, but then
also, throughout all the levels and individuals that make up the organization, was
the safety culture. As Mr. O’Keefe
explained to his employees, there was a general climate for safety as being a
number one priority, and although in theory, this notion of safety was an absolute
within the agency, it seemed to be more conceptual then actual (C-Span, 2004).
He stressed that safety could no longer
just be an assumed concept; it had to be a “fundamental requisite, embedded in
the foundation and part of the everything we do”. Therefore, the Columbia Shuttle accident wasn’t
something that could be blamed on one individual, or one group, or even a
simple technical malfunction, but instead was the fault of a culture that did
not follow through with the original mission and vision of the agency. The tragedy was on the hands of every
employee, starting with leadership. In the
BST report, there is an emphasis for managers to act in ways that reflect the
NASA values, starting with respect towards others (BST, 2004).
I personally feel that he was
sugar-coating everything in the video. Yes,
he pointed out the flaws in the NASA culture, but seemed to be “skating” the
issues. He never directly insisted that
NASA messed up, instead, gently massaged the idea that maybe the NASA culture
could be a little better even though it was almost perfect. His resistance in assuming full-blown
responsibility on behalf of NASA, made his discourse seem insincere. It is like saying “it’s my fault, but….”. I also found his ridiculous statements, in
response to the question of accountability, about adopting the statement “yes,
if” instead of “no, because” to be very evasive (C-Span, 2004). I found his statements to be vague and in
some cases nonsensical. I believe that a
more upfront attitude regarding the need to change the NASA culture needs to be
more aggressive and direct. I feel that
employees will probably be more inclined, motivated and influenced to adopt
these changes if they are presented as something that, if not followed through
with, will have imminent consequences. Mr.
O’Keefe does not project integrity in my opinion and his laissez faire attitude
about “we just need to tweak what is almost perfect” is far from convincing.
In
my experience, when I have adopted similar attitudes to those exemplified by Mr.
O’Keefe, I feel that I am not very convincing. I feel that my intentions reflect as shallow
and that my integrity is compromised. I
think the take-away for me from this video is that a real leader should know
when to step up to the plate for the good and for the bad. If mistakes are made and accountability is
demanded (which I’m sure it was in the case of the Columbia Shuttle accident),
we need to be ready to take responsibility followed by solid immediate and long
term solutions. Although I agree that
culture change for NASA should be a priority, it’s important to note that culture
change is a long and difficult process (Brown, 2011). As a leader I would
also ask myself, what immediate and tangible changes can I make right now
initially? Another important takeaway is not only the importance of a proper
diagnosis, but who does the diagnosis. Mr.
O’Keefe was asked why they brought in BST to assist them in making this
assessment if NASA was apparently capable and had the resources to do its own
assessments, and he explained that it was important for the issue to be viewed
from the outside in. He understood the
importance of another perspective. Brown
(2011) notes that:
“Questioning the client’s diagnosis of the problem is a good
rule for organization development practitioners to follow. The client is part
of the system that has a problem and, therefore, may be unable to take an
objective view of the situation” (p. 116).
This is
another important aspect of good organizational development since it is easy to
be blindsided by what you want to see rather then what is in front of your
eyes. I personally sometimes have a
difficult time seeing alternate perspectives on issues I feel very strongly
about. This is an area I know that needs
to be improved if I am to be the kind of leader that I aspire to be.
References
C-Span. (2004, April 13). NASA cultural changes [Video file]. Retrieved from
http://www.c-span.org/video/?181348-1/
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